

Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAM-01 AID-05 EB-07 TRSE-00 OMB-01 ACDA-05

EUR-12 SAJ-01 IO-10 /105 W
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R 140901Z AUG 75 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3170
INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY SANA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 1198

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SO, XF

SUBJECT: SOMALI-ARAB RELATIONS: HARD TIMES

1. WARMTH BETWEEN SOMALIA AND ITS ARAB BROTHERS HAS BEEN COOLING STEADILY SINCE JUNE POSTPONEMENT OF ARAB SUMMIT IN MOGADISCIO AND ARAB FAILURE TO DELIVER ON ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS' PLEDGE OF US\$ 103 MILLION TO HELP RESOLVE SOMALI ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. EGYPT HAS TAKEN BRUNT OF SOMALI FIRE -- FOR REASONS NOT RVX NOT WHOLLY DUE TO SUMMIT FAILURE OR SIAD'S FINANCIAL DISAPPOINTMENTS. LIBYA ALONE SEEMS TO BE ENJOYING FOOD RELATIONS, BECAME OF ITS DELIVERY OF US\$ 10 MILLION IN DROUGHT ASSISTANCE, BUT ALSO FOR OTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS.

2. SOMALI DISAPPOINTMENT OVER SUMMIT FAILURE HAS ALSO RESULTED
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IN SOMALI DECISION TO CHANGE ITS AMBASSADORS IN JIDDA, CAIRO,

KHARTOUM, KUWAIT, -- AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE -- WITH SUCCESSORS EXPECTED TO MORE REALISTICALLY INTERPRET SIAD'S POLICIES FOR ARABS. MOST PRO-ARAB MEMBERS OF SUPREME REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, LIKE OMAR JESS AND OSMAN JELLE, ARE LYING LOW. THEIR INFLUENCE NOW GREATLY REDUCED - AT LEAST FOR TIME BEING.

3. WE UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY OMAR ARTEH IS IN TROUBLE AND MAY BE REPLACED. WHILE SIMILAR REPORTS HAVE OCCURED IN PAST, ARTEH'S REMOVAL NOW APPEARS TO BE POSSIBILITY. HIS LOSS WOULD BE LESS SIGNIFICANT IN MOGADISCIO THAN IN ARAB CAPITALS, WHERE HE ENJOYS POPULARITY AND RESPECT AS SYMBOL OF WHAT SOMALI MIGHT BECOME UNDER ARAB TUTELEGE (I.E., HE SPEAKS ARABIC, IS GOOD MOSLEM AND FIRMLY PRO-ARAB). SOMALI OFFICIAL APPARKFTLY BEING GROOMED AS SUCCESSOR IS SECSTATE FOR MINERALS, HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR QUASSIM, A YOUNG LAW SCHOOL GRADUATE WHO HAS NO RPT NO CLOSE TIES TO ARABS. HE ATTENDED OAU LIB COMMITTEE MEETING IN RABAT AND HAS BEEN SITTING IN AS FONMIN REP ON LOCAL BILATERAL EXCHANGES WITH IMPORTANT FOREIGN VISITORS.

4. PURPOSE OF SOMALI DIPLOMATIC ADJUSTMENTS APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPT TO INJECT GREATER REALISM INTO SOMALI-ARAB RELATIONS. TOUGHER SOMALI LINE WITH ARABS MIGHT MAKE IT LESS EASY FOR SOME ARABS TO ACCOMMODATE SIAD BUT PERHAPS TIME HAS COME FOR GREATER REALISM -- FOR ARAB NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST ACCEPT SIAD REGIME, SOVIET WANTS AND ALL, AND CANNOT EXPECT POLICY CHANGES OR SHORT-TERM POLITICAL PAYOFFS AS PRICE OF GREATER ARAB ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- AN EXPECTATION WHICH SOMALI PRO-ARAB FACTION -- INCLUDING AMBASSADORS BEING RECALLED -- HAS EVIDENTLY ENCOURAGED IN ARAB CAPITALS.

5. WE UNDERSTAND ALSO SIAD IS PARTICULARLY ANGRY AT HUMILIATING FAILURE OF HIS TOUR OF ARAB CAPITALS TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FOR MOGADISCIO SUMMIT. HE BLAMES SRC PRO-ARAB CLIQUE, AS WELL AS SOMALI AMBASSADORS IN JIDDA, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, FOR NOT RPT NOT MORE COURAGEOUSLY INFORMING HIM THAT HIS EXPECTATIONS MIGHT BE UNREALISTIC BUT ALSO FOR NOT RPT NOT EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTING HIS INTERESTS IN ARAB CAPITALS.

6. SOME ARAB DIPLOMATS HERE PERCEIVE SOVIET HAND IN TOUGHER SOMALI LINE WITH ARABS. THIS MAY BE TRUE -- ESPECIALLY WITH
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SOMALI CAMPAIGN AGAINST EGYPTIANS, WHICH HAS BEEN CONTINUING ONE SINCE 1972, AND REDUCTION IN IRAQI AMBASSADOR'S LOCAL ACCESS (SEE BELOW) -- BUT SOVIET INPUT ISN'T NECESSARY TO FULLY EXPLAIN THE CHANGES. THE FACT IS THAT SIAD'S AND HIS ENVOYS' ATTEMPTS TO ATTRACT ARAB ECONOMIC SUPPORT HAVE FAILED AND TIME HAS COME FOR NEW FACES AND NEW APPROACH. PERMANENT REDUCTION OF PRO-ARAB INFLUENCE IN SRC AND AMONG CIVIL SERVANTS IS OBJECTIVE SOVIETS DO SUPPORT AND THIS MAY BE LONGER TERM RESULT OF CURRENT CHANGES

TAKING PLACE.

7. FOLLOWING SUMMARIZES STATE OF SOMALI-ARAB RELATIONS ON
INDIVIDUAL BASIS.

8. SOMALI-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS:

A. SOMALI GOVT EXPELLED EGYPTIAN HEAD OF ISLAMIC CULTURAL CENTER
ON JULY 26; EGYPTIAN SHIP CAPTAIN WHO WAS MASTER OF JOINTLY OWNED
SOMALI/LIBYAN VESSEL WAS EXPELLED WEEK EARLIER. EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR
WAS UNABLE TO DISCUSS EXPULSIONS WITH ANYONE OF CONSEQUENCE
IN SOMALI GOVT. AL-AHRAM AND AKBAR ALSO EMBARGOED FOR
DISTRIBUTION IN SOMALIA SINCE EARLY JULY. SOMALI AMBASSADOR TO
EGYPT HAS BEEN RECALLED (HE WAS ONLY PERMITTED TO RETURN TO CAIRO
TO PACK HIS BAGS AFTER HIS WEALTHY FATHER-IN-LAW, WHO IS ALSO OMAR
ARTEH'S FATHER-IN-LAW, GUARANTEED HIS RETURN TO SOMALIA FROM
CAIRO).

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3171

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

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B. COMMENT: SOMALI CAMPAIGN AGAINST EGYPT HAS BEEN CONTINUING ONE SINCE 1972. CAMPAIGN WAXES AND WANES WITH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOMALIA AND ELSEWHERE, PARTICULARLY MIDDLE EAST, WHERE SADAT'S PEACE-SEEKING TACTICS ARE NOT RPT NOT SUPPORTED BY SIAD. AT LOWER LEVELS -- IN NSS AND MININFORMATION -- SOVIET ADVISORS OR THEIR SURROGATES ARE PROBABLY DIRECT FACTOR IN SOMALI HARASSMENT OF EGYPTIANS BUT THERE IS NEVERTHELESS AGREEMENT AT TOP BY SIAD THAT EGYPT IS STEERING WRONG POLICY COURSE. EGYPT HAS RESIDUAL INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA, PARTICULARLY AMONG EGYPTIAN-TRAINED ARMY OFFICERS, AND ALSO MAINTAINS CADRES OF EGYPTIAN TEACHERS AND AZHARI SHEIHKs IN MOGADISCIO. EGYPTIANS BELIEVE THAT RUSSIANS ARE TRYING TO PUT AN END TO EGYPTIAN PROGRAMS HERE TO HELP CANCEL OUT RESIDUAL EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE. WE TEND TO AGREE. EGYPTIAN EMBASSY NEVERTHELESS REFUSES TO BE INTIMIDATED AND IS DETERMINED TO WAIT OUT POLITICAL DOG-DAYS.

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9. SOMALI-SAUDI RELATIONS: SAUDI MISSION HERE IS SMALL, HEADED BY CHARGE WHO IS INACTIVE AND MAINTAINS LOW-PROFILE. SOMALI GOVT IS RECALLING AMBASSADOR TO JIDDA AND REPORTEDLY REPLACING HIM WITH HARD-LINER WHO IS CLAN COUSING OF SIAD AND EX-CONGEN IN DJIBOUTI. DURING HIS JIDDA VISIT, SIAD WAS ANGERED BY ANTICS OF LARGE SOMALI POPULATION IN JIDDA -- MOST OF THEM ISHAAKS FROM NORTH -- AND DRUBBING THEY GAVE HIM IN QUESTION-AND-ANSWER SESSION, WHEN THEY ACCUSED HIM OF BEING COMMUNIST. HE REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT SOMALI EMIGRES ARE FACTOR -- ALBEIT SMALL ONE -- IN SAG'S FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND HIS REGIME. NORTHERNERS HERE BELIEVE NEW AMBASSADOR IN JIDDA MAY ATTEMPT TO PUT SCREWS TO SOMALI EXILES THROUGH RELATIVES IN SOMALIA AND SILENCE WHAT GSDR BELIEVES IS NEGATIVE INFLUENCE.

10. SOMALI-IRAQI RELATIONS: ARAB HERE DETECTED A CHANGE IN ACCESS TO SOMALI OFFICIALDOM ENJOYED BY IRAQI AMBASSADOR -- LONG A FAVORITE OF SIAD -- FOLLOWING SAMANTAR'S RETURN FROM MOSCOW THREE MONTHS AGO. IRAQI ACCESS TO SIAD AND TOP SRC RANKS HAS BEEN CLOSED OFF AND IRAQI AMBASSADOR NOW ENJOYS NO BETTER ACCESS THAN OTHER ARAB OR WESTERN ENVOYS, WHICH IS VERY LITTLE INDEED. ALSO IRAQI EMBASSY COMPLAINED TO MOFA THAT ITS DIPLOMATS BEING HARASSED -- THAT IS, SUBJECT TO SAME CLOSE SURVEILLANCE OTHER FOREIGN MISSIONS HERE HAVE LEARNED TO LIVE WITH. EROSION IN IRAQI INFLUENCE HERE IS INTERPRETED AS REFLECTION OF SOVIET DISSATISFACTION WITH STATE OF MOSCOW/BAGHDAD RELATIONS -- A DISSATISFACTION WHICH SOVIET OFFICIALS MADE EXPLICIT TO GENERAL SAMANTAR DURING HIS MOSCOW TRIP. IRAQI/ SOMALI RELATIONS MAY BE IMPROVING AGAIN HOWEVER WITH VISIT OF SRC MEMBER AND POL OFFICE DIRECTOR ABDULCADIR HAJI MOHAMED AND SOMALI AIR FORCE COMMANDER TO BAGHDAD. THEY LEFT MOGADISCIO ON AUGUST 9TH AT HEAD OF SEVEN TO EIGHT MAN DELEGATION.

11. SYRIAN-SOMALI RELATIONS: SYRIAN AMBAASSADOR TO SOMALI DEPARTING

THIS MONTH TO RETURN TO DAMASCUS. DEPARTURE IS ABRUPT AND HE INFORMED US AUG 13 IN CONFIDENCE THAT SOMALI GOVT OBTAINED HIS RECALL. SOMALI DISSATISFACTION MAY BE MORE WITH HIS PERSONAL CONDUCT THAN WITH HIS ABILITY TO INTERPRET REGIME FOR DAMASCUS, BUT HE HAS BEEN OUTSPOKEN AND INDISCREET IN HIS CRITICISM.

12. LIBYAN-SOMALI RELATIONS: LIBYA HAS PUSHED AHEAD WITH ITS JOINT PROJECTS IN SOMALIA -- SHIPPING LINE, AGRICULTURAL PROJECT, BANK -- AND MADE US\$ 10 MILLION CONTRIBUTION TO DROUGHT RELIEF. LIBYAN CRITICISM OF SADAT AND LIBYAN MILITARY TIES WITH SOVIETS
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ALSO BENEFIT LIBYAN AMBASSADOR HERE, WHO ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH SOVIET EMBASSY AS WELL. LIBYAN ENVOY BELIEVES OTHER ARAB CAPITALS DEAD WRONG IN THEIR RELUHWANCE TO GIVE MORE GENEROUSLY TO SIAD REGIME. HE IS FIRMLY PRO-ARAB AND BELIEVES OTHER ARABS MAKING SERIOUS MISTAKE IN FAILING TO SUPPORT SIAD AND FURTHER OPENING DOOR TO RUSSIANS.

13. SOMALI-PDRY RELATIONS: PDRY APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT SOURED ON SIAD REGIME AS A RESULT OF A FEW THORNY BILATERAL PROBLEMS. THESE INCLUDE SOMALI ARROGANCE DURING GUEURY AFFAIR (MOGADISCIO 463), DIFFICULTY IN REPATRIATING ADEN AIRLINES EARNINGS, AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESTRICTIONS ON EMBASSY'S OPERATION. PDRY AMBASSADOR IS FED UP WITH SOMALIA, BUT HIS DISSATISFACTION MAY BE MERELY PERSONAL. PDRY FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED SOMALIA IN EARLY AUGUST, TOURED DROUGHT AREAS AND MET WITH SIAD BUT WE DON'T YET KNOW WHAT THEY TALKED ABOUT.

14. OTHER ARABS. SOMALI RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT, QATAR, AND YAR -- ALL OF WHOM HAVE MISSIONS IN MOGADISCIO -- ARE PROPER BUT BY NO MEANS CLOSE. EARLIER THIS YEAR YAR REASSIGNED ITS AMBASSADOR HERE TO ADDIS, WHERE HE IS NOW ACCREDITED TO MOGADISCIO. NEW KUWAITI AMBASSADOR SPENT SEVERAL MONTHS IN SOMALIA IN EARLY 1975 -- AFTER TOURS IN TOKYO AND TEHRAN, -- THEN RETURNED TO KUWAIT AND RETIRED. MISSION WAS HEADED FOR TIME BY CHARGE DRAWN FROM KUWAIT EMBASSY IN NAIROBI WHO RETURNED TO KENYA IN JULY. QATAR AMBASSADOR ARRIVED ONLY FEW MONTHS AGO AND IS STILL GETTING HIS FEET ON GROUND.
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